The applicant does not dispute that delivery dates are an essential issue. However, the parties could not have foreseen that the option agreement was non-binding and they also contained an effective mechanism for determining delivery dates, without the need for an agreement in the future. The applicant argued that the latter point was based on two other implied terms. Its main case was the delivery date was the earliest date that the defendant with his best efforts in 2016 (option 1) or 2017 (options two and three) and failing that, the earliest date they could offer with his best efforts. Furthermore, it argued that the delivery date was objectively appropriate if the defendant`s undertaking was taken into account, given the defendant`s obligation, which must be determined by the court if it is not agreed. The parties are often under pressure to reach an agreement quickly and can therefore use a later agreement to “achieve the agreement”. Morris illustrates the risks associated with this approach and how saving time in development can lead to costly legal disputes that can be extremely troublesome for a company, especially if the party wants to rely on the concept in question. Morris was involved in a sales contract (the “SPA”) for shares of a company. The complainant received approximately $16 million as his first consideration. The OSG also provided for deferred consideration through a provision for benefits for the applicant`s counselling services.
The OSG explained that the applicant had “the opportunity” to provide his advisory services between the parties for a period of four years from the close of the SG and “another reasonably agreed period. The complainant provided his services for four years and received approximately $4 million in return, calculated according to a formula agreed to in the ASA. The applicant then sought an “appropriate extension” for the provision of his services, which the respondent refused to do. In the first appeal, the High Court found that the applicant had an enforceable right to counselling services for the first four-year period, but was not entitled to do so for another period. The obligation on the parties to agree on the length of an additional period was not applicable, as it was an agreement that did not contain a “mechanism” or “objective standard” for the Tribunal to “conclude” on the duration of the extension.